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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this appeal is properly reposed in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e), as an appeal from a court of record not involving a first degree 
or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. Was the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury that a combination of 
physical conduct, or actus reus, and a culpable mental state, or mens rea, 
was necessary to convict Geukgeuzian of the crimes charged manifest 
error? 
i. Standard of Review. Plain Error, Rule 19 (c), Utah R. Crim. P., 
American Fork v. Carr 970 P. 2d 717 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
ii. Preservation of Issue. Where a jury instruction was not objected to at 
trial, appellate review is still possible in regards to issues of manifest 
injustice. 
II. Was the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury concerning the 
requisite mental state necessary to convict Geukgeuzian for the two 
offenses charged was tantamount to a failure to give a necessary elements 
instruction and therefore manifest injustice as a matter of law. 
i. Standard of Review. Plain Error, Rule 19 (c), Utah R. Crim. P., State 
v. Gibson 908 P. 2d 352 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). American Fork v. Carr 
970 P. 2d 717 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
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ii. Preservation of Issue. Where a jury instruction was not objected to at 
trial, appellate review is still possible in regards to issues of manifest 
injustice. 
Was the trial court's failure to instruct the jury concerning the statutory 
definition of "knowing," as it applies to False Written Statements a failure 
to give a necessary elements instruction and therefore manifest injustice as 
a matter of law. 
i. Standard of Review. Plain Error, Rule 19 (c), Utah R. Crim. P., 
American Fork v. Carr 970 P. 2d 717 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
ii. Preservation of Issue. Where a jury instruction was not objected to at 
trial, appellate review is still possible in regards to issues of manifest 
injustice. 
Did trial counsel's failure to object to the question directed to Lyons 
asking if Appellant btew that Lyon had heard him make threats against his 
estranged wife, operate to deny Appellant effective assistance of counsel 
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of United States 
Constitution? 
i. Standard of Review. Reversible Error, State v. Verde 770 P. 2d 116 
(Utah 1989). 
ii. Preservation of Issue. Where a jury instruction was not objected to at 
trial, appellate review is still possible in regards to issues of manifest 
injustice. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are determinative of the issues or portion thereof addressed in the 
respective briefs of the parties. The text of the statutes is presented in its entirety in the 
Addendum. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-504 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature, Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Second District Court in and for Davis 
County, Utah, convicting Defendant/Appellant of Witness Tampering and Written False 
Statements in an order styled Minutes, Sentence, Judgment, Commitment and dated February 7, 
2001. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. In May of 2000, Appellant, at the urging of his attorney, approached several co-
workers at Hill Air Force Base, and requested that they write a statement on Appellant's behalf 
in conjunction with an ex-parte protective order Geukgeuzian's estranged wife had filed. One 
such co-worker was Airman Jason Lyon ("Lyon"). (Appellate Record, hereinafter R., 00141: 
99.) 
2. Appellant asked Lyon to include in his statement whether Appellant had made 
threats against his estranged wife. (R. 00141: 120-25.) 
3. Unbeknownst to Appellant, Lyon had, approximately one week before, provided a 
written statement to the Office of Special Investigations ("OSI") of Hill Air Force Base wherein 
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he stated, among other things, that he had overheard Appellant make threats or speak 
threateningly against his estranged wife. (R. 00141: 25-29.) 
4. Lyon testified that at no time did Appellant make any verbal or physical threats 
towards him nor did Appellant promise Lyon anything to induce him to write the statement. (R. 
00141:56.) 
5. Lyon agreed to write a statement on behalf of Appellant without voicing any 
objection whatsoever. Subsequently, Lyon wrote a statement while he was alone at his 
dormitory. He later gave the statement to Appellant. (R. 00141: 33-34.) 
6. Lyon at no time told Appellant (1) about the OSI investigation; (2) that Lyon had 
previously provided a written statement to OSI; (3) that the statement which he had given to OSI 
was contrary to the statement he had given to Appellant; or (4) that Lyon did not believe what he 
had written. (R. 00141: 123-25.) 
7. Lyon did not inform his superior officers or any member of OSI that Appellant 
had asked for, and that he had provided him, a wTitten statement. (R. 00141: 42-43, 46.) 
8. Appellant provided Lyon's written statement to his attorney Pete Vlahos who 
subsequently submitted the same to the Second District Court in a protective order hearing. (R. 
00141:100.) 
9. Lyon pleaded guilty to giving a false written statement, a Class B Misdemeanor in 
exchange for his agreement to testify against Appellant. (R. 00141: 51-52.) 
10. Defense counsel at trial, Richard J. Culbertson, failed to object to a line of 
questioning between the State's attorney and Lyon wherein Lyon testified as to the personal 
knowledge and state of mind of defendant. (R. 00141: 31.) 
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11. Culbertson passed, without objection, the jury instructions which were ultimately 
given to the jury. (R. 00048-00069; R. 00141: 135-142.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. The requisite mental state is an element of the crimes charged and the court must 
instruct the jury with regard to the requisite mental state. 
a. Given the critical nature of applying a proper mental state during jury 
deliberations, Appellant suffered manifest injustice when the trial court failed to instruct the jury 
as to the mental state required of the Appellant to sustain a conviction for tampering with a 
witness. 
b. The Trial Court committed reversible Error when it misstated the law with 
regard to the mental state required to be found guilty of false written statement and failed to 
define the mental state of "knowing." 
II. Appellant was denied affective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the United 
States Constitution when trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. 
a. Trial counsel's failure to object to the jury instructions that were obviously 
flawed in regard to critical elements of the crimes charged constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
b. Where the essence of Appellant's defense was his lack of knowledge with 
regard to asking Airman Lyon to write a statement, trial counsel's failure to object to 
Prosecutor's line of questioning in this regard constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY REGARDING THE REQUISITE 
MENTAL STATE REQUIRED FOR CONVICTION CONSTITUTES 
MANIFEST INJUSTICE AND IS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
When the trial court failed to instruct the jury that in order to find Appellant guilty of the 
crimes charged, he would have had to not only engage in the proscribed actions, but also possess 
the necessary state of mind, the court committed plain error sufficient to support the overturning 
of the jury verdict. Under Utah Law, "[e]very offense not involving strict liability shall require 
a culpable mental state, and when the offense does not specify a culpable mental state . . . intent, 
knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-2-102 (1983). Further, "a defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until 
each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . the 
words 'element of the offense' mean: (a) the conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of 
conduct proscribed, prohibited or forbidden in the definition of the offense; (b) the culpable 
mental state required." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1973) (emphasis added). See also 
American Fork v. Carr, 970 P.2d 717, 720 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("When instructing the jury on 
the elements of the offense, the trial court must specifically instruct the jury regarding the 
'culpable mental state required' to commit the offense."). 
Jury instructions are deficient when a court fails to instruct on all the elements of a crime, 
including defining the requisite mental state required to find the defendant guilty of the crimes 
charged. In reviewing the jury instructions on elements of a crime of a trial court, this Court 
should apply a correctness standard. State v. Stephenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). While Utah R. Crim. P. 19 (c) prohibits review of jury instructions that were not 
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objected to at trial absent a showing of 'manifest injustice1, u[f]ailure to give an elements 
instruction for a crime satisfies the manifest injustice standard under Rule 19 (c) and constitutes 
reversible error as a matter of law." State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), 
(quoting State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991)). When reviewing the jury instructions 
at issue here in this light, it is clear that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury and the 
resulting manifest injustice entitles Appellant to a reversal of his convictions. 
a. The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error When it Failed to 
Include Instructions Defining the Mental state Required Under 
Tampering With a Witness. 
Appellant was convicted of violating Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (witness tampering). 
An examination of this statute in conjunction with the jury instructions clearly establishes a 
failure on the part of the trial court to adequately instruct the jury regarding the requisite mental 
state. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 states in pertinent part, "a person is guilty of a third degree 
felony if, believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be 
instituted, he attempts to induce or otherwise cause a person to: (a) testify or inform falsely; (b) 
withhold any testimony, information, document or item . . ." Id. According to Instruction No. 
29 of the instructions submitted to the jury by the trial court2, in order to find Appellant guilty of 
the crime of tampering with a witness, the jury must find all of the following elements, "1 . That 
on or about May 15, 2000, in Davis County, State of Utah: 2. The Defendant Stephen Lamar 
Geukgeuzian, believing an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be 
instituted; 3. Attempted to induce or other [sic] cause a person to: a. Testify or inform falsely; or 
b. Withhold any testimony, information, document, or item." (R. 00061). While the language of 
1
 The failure of trial counsel to object to the jury instructions as proposed by the court will be discussed more fully 
in Appellant's arguments regarding ineffective assistance of counsel. 
" A true and correct copy of the jury instructions has been provided in the Addendum. 
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the instruction seems to track the language of the statute, there is no further explanation 
regarding the culpable mental state required for a conviction in this or any other instruction 
submitted. The failure of the trial court to provide such an explanation is reversible error. 
In making a determination of guilt regarding tampering with a witness, there are in reality 
two mental states that must be evaluated. The first is whether the person charged, "believfed] 
that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted . . ." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-508 (1). The law with regard to the requisite mental state attached to this portion of 
the statute is clear, "the statute requires no more than a defendant believe an official proceeding 
or investigation to be underway." State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876-77 (Utah 1985) (emphasis 
in original). 
Where a statute does not specifically identify a culpable mental state, "intent, knowledge, 
or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 
(1983). Thus, there must be some level of knowledge, intent3, or recklessness on the part of the 
Appellant with regard to the falsity of the testimony or information by which he allegedly 
attempted to induce or otherwise caused a person to act or refrain from acting. In determining 
which of these mental states apply to the witness tampering statute, Utah courts have established 
that, to be convicted of tampering with a witness, a defendant must "knowingly and intentionally 
[attempt] to induce or otherwise cause another person to [testify or inform falsely; or] withhold 
any testimony, information, document, or thing." State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) (emphasis added). See also Sate v. Danker, 599 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1979) (noting 
that to be found guilty of witness tampering defendant would have to know her daughter would 
be a witness in a subsequent proceeding; and that she told her daughter not to testify). However, 
J
 Although Instruction No. 34 does define "intentionally," it is of little or no use to the jury as it is not explained to 
which Instruction or portion thereof this definition applies. 
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Instruction No. 29 merely states in pertinent part, "attempted to induce or other cause a 
person to: a. Testify or inform falsely; or b. Withhold any testimony, information, document, or 
item." There is no language in Instruction No. 29, or anywhere else in the Jury Instructions, 
delineating what mental state the defendant must possess to support a conviction of attempting to 
induce or cause a person to inform falsely. 
Further instruction as to the proper mental state to apply in this regard can be gleaned 
from the Legislature's use of the word attempt in as an element in the witness tampering statute. 
Like any attempted crime, the requisite mental state to be applied with regard to witness 
tampering should be the same—namely, a specific intent to induce the identified acts. See e.g., 
State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 847 (Utah 1992) (noting historical position of the Court that an 
attempt to commit a crime is an act done with the intent to commit that crime). Thus, to be 
found guilty of attempting to induce the acts identified in the statute, Appellant must have 
intended to induce a person to testify falsely or withhold any testimony, information, document, 
or item to meet the elements of attempting to induce these acts. 
The trial court, however, failed to supply any instructions with regard to the mental state 
which the law required the defendant to possess in order to convict Appellant. Such a failure is 
reversible error. The standard here is not whether the jury correctly applied the proper culpable 
mental state, but rather, whether the court "properly instructed] the jury on the elements of the 
offense charged." American Fork, 970 P.2d at 720. As the court failed to instruct the jury 
regarding whether Appellant intentionally and knowingly induced a person to testify or inform 
falsely, the jury instructions are deficient and Appellant's conviction must be reversed and 
remanded for a new trial. 
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b. The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error When it Failed to 
Properly State the Law Regarding False Written Statement and 
Failed to Define the Mental State of "Knowing." 
Appellant was also convicted of violating Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-504 (written false 
statement). A review of the Instructions provided by the trial court in regards to this charge 
clearly establishes manifest injustice and represents reversible error. The statutory definition of 
false written statement provides in pertinent part, "with the intent to deceive a public servant in 
the performance of his official function, he: (a) makes any written statement which he does not 
believe to be true; or . . . (c) submits or invites reliance on any writing which he knows to be 
lacking in authenticity." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-504 (2). The corresponding jury instruction 
given by the trial court indicated that in order to find defendant guilty, defendant, "intending to 
deceive a public servant in the performance of his official function; a. Made or caused to be 
made a written false statement which defendant did not believe to be true; or b. Submitted or 
invited reliance upon a writing which defendant knew to be lacking in authenticity." See Jury 
Instruction No. 30 (emphasis added). Although the phrase "or caused to be made" is not part of 
the criminal statute, the trial court did incorporate the phrase into Instruction No. 30. (R.00062). 
By adding the terms "or caused to be made" the court impermissibly expanded the scope of this 
statute and the error is not cured when examining the instructions as a whole. See State v. 
Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141, 1146 (Utah 1989) (jury instructions must be read and evaluated as a 
whole). 
A challenge to a jury instruction as incorrectly stating the law presents a question of law, 
which is reviewed for correctness. See e.g., State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); 
State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (1993), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 979 (1993). In this 
matter, no evidence was before the court to support an allegation that Appellant made a false 
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written statement. Rather, the evidence presented dealt with a statement submitted by Airman 
Lyons. As a result, the additional language added by the court in Instruction No. 30 
impermissibly expands the scope of the statute by inferring that Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-504 
(2)(a) would include a written false statement of a third party which was made at the request of 
Appellant. However, under the plain language of the statute, Subsection (2)(a) only applies to 
false written statements made by the defendant. See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 
1993) (holding the correct interpretation of a statute as contained injury instructions must first 
be reviewed in light of the plain language of the statute). The language of the instruction created 
a likelihood of confusion on the part of the jury such that by asking Lyons to make a written 
statement, which Appellant did not believe to be true, he could be convicted under Subsection 
(2)(a). Clearly, the legislature, through the plain language of the statute, intended subsection 
(2)(a) to apply only to written statements made by the defendant himself. Conversely, 
Subsection (2)(c) was intended to cover writings not made by the defendant but which defendant 
invited reliance on. By adding the words "caused to be made" to the instructions, the court has 
effectively hybridized the two subsections creating a catchall instruction. This hybrid instruction 
allows and invites the jury to disregard the requirement of Subsection (2)(c) that defendant know 
the writing lacks authenticity. The instruction also confuses truth or veracity, which is the focus 
of Subsection (2)(a), with authenticity, which is the focus of Subsection (2)(c). The prejudice 
suffered by Appellant as a result of this hybridization is further exacerbated by the trial court's 
failure to include an instruction regarding a "knowing" mental state. As a result, the trial court's 
expansion of the scope of subsection (2)(a) created an obvious incorrect statement of the law and 
this statement affected the substantial rights of the Appellant. 
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Even assuming, arguendo, that the misstatements of Instruction No. 30 (2) (a) could be 
cured by the correct language of Instruction No. 30 (2) (b), the failure of the court to instruct the 
jury with regards to the elements of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-504 (2) (c) once again results in 
manifest injustice and reversible error. A critical element of subsection (2) (c) is that the 
defendant knew that the writing upon which he invited reliance upon was lacking in authenticity. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (2) defines knowingly as being "aware of the nature of his conduct 
or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a 
result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result." 
Id. The jury instructions given by the trial court contain no instructions regarding the mental 
state necessary to find that Appellant acted with the knowledge sufficient to find him guilty 
under Instruction No. 30 (2)(b). As a result, the instructions are incomplete as the trial court 
failed to instruct the jury as to each element of the crime charged. As discussed in detail supra, 
"[f]ailure to give an elements instruction for a crime satisfies the manifest injustice standard 
under Rule 19 (c) and constitutes reversible error as a matter of law." Gibson, 908 P.2d at 354 
(citation omitted). As a result, the instructions given regarding false written statement are also 
fatally flawed and Appellant is entitled to a reversal of his conviction. 
In sum, the jury instructions submitted to the jury by the trial court are sufficiently 
problematic so as to establish manifest injustice and entitle Appellant to a remand for a new trial. 
The instructions contained misstatements of the law, which mislead the jury and allowed them to 
make impermissible assumptions regarding the level of culpability required for a conviction. 
More damaging to the substantial rights of the Appellant is the trial court's failure to instruct on 
all the elements of the crimes charged, including the necessary mens rea to sustain a conviction. 
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As a result of these obvious errors, Appellant was denied his right to a fair trial and his 
convictions must be reversed. 
II. TRIAL COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE FELL BELOW AN OBJECTIVE 
STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS AND AS A RESULT THE 
OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL WAS PREJUDICED. 
By failing to object to the State's questioning of its witness and failing to object to jury 
instructions, which clearly and obviously incorrectly defined the law and failed to instruct as to 
the elements necessary to obtain a conviction, trial counsel's performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. Such errors prejudiced the Appellant and deprived him of a fair trial. 
The United States Supreme Court has established a two-part test to determine whether a 
defendant was deprived of his Constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. 
This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 
not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's 
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 
whose result is reliable. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). This test for determining the adequacy of 
trial counsel has been embraced and applied by Utah courts. See e.g., State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 
182, 186 (Utah 1990). Despite the presumption of competence as expressed in Strickland and its 
progeny, Utah courts have continually noted that appellate courts "must review each case 
carefully to prevent the infrequent meritorious claim from being reflexively swept into the tide of 
affirmance by the chronicles of probability." State v. Moritzsky, 111 P.2d 688, 690 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). Rather, the appellate court must not "mechanically apply the two-part standard . . . 
but instead . . . 'focus upon the fundamental fairness of the proceeding challenged. The purpose 
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of the inquiry is simply to insure that the defendant receives a fair trial.'" Id. (quoting State v. 
Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
'The prejudice test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims is equivalent to the 
harmfulness test applied in assessing plain error." State v. Parker, 4 P.3d 778, 780 (Utah 2000). 
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 
(i) identify specific acts or omissions that fall below the standard of 
reasonable professional assistance when considered at the time of the act or 
omission and under all attendant circumstances, and (ii) demonstrate that 
counsel's error prejudiced the defendant, i.e., that but for the error, there is a 
reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to 
the defendant. 
Id. at 781-82 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah 1993)). When viewed in this 
light, the record shows that the performance of Appellant's trial counsel not only falls below an 
objective level of reasonableness, but also that there is a reasonable likelihood that the result of 
the trial would have been different but for the ineffective assistance. 
a. Trial Counsel's Failure to Object to the Jury Instructions as Presented by the 
Trial Court Constituted Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 
As noted above, the jury instructions submitted by the court were seriously deficient in 
several ways. Trial counsel had access to these instructions for review before they were 
submitted to the jury. Likewise, trial counsel was present in court as the instructions were read 
aloud to the jury. Yet at no time did trial counsel object to the lack of mens rea instructions or 
the misstatement of the law as found in Instruction No. 30. An objection to the language of the 
jury instructions would have been made outside the presence of the jury. Thus, no possible 
prejudice would have inured to the defendant had such an objection been made. As a result, 
there is no rational explanation or tactical reason for trial counsel's failure to object to the 
language of the Instructions. Where no possible explanation or tactical reason exists for such a 
14 
decision, Utah courts have held that the first part of the Strickland test has been met. See e.g., 
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990); State v. Maestas, 984 P.2d 376, 381 (Utah 
1999). 
The court must then look to the second prong of the Strickland test, the prejudice to the 
Appellant. Objecting to the jury instructions would have ensured that the mens rea requirements 
of both Instruction No. 29 and Instruction No. 30 restricted the jurors to considering the proper 
elements of the crimes charged. As a result of trial counsel's errors, however, jurors were free to 
insert whatever standard of culpability they wished, rather than applying the proper standards as 
required by law. Thus, it is impossible to determine on the basis of the record whether the jury 
applied the evidence to each element that the prosecution was required to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Where this Court cannot determine from the record whether the proper 
elements were considered, there is a reasonable probability of a different result. See State v. 
Callahan, 866 P.2d 590, 595 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); see also State v. Finlayson, 994 P.2d 1243, 
1249 (Utah 2000) (failure to object to jury instructions which identified incorrect elements of 
crime sufficient to establish prejudice under Strickland). As a result of trial counsel's clear 
failure to provide effective assistance and the prejudice suffered by Appellant as a result of 
counsel's failure to object to the jury instructions, Appellant is entitled to a reversal of his 
convictions. 
b. Trial Counsel's Failure to Object to Prosecutor's Line of Questioning to 
Airman Lyon Regarding Appellant's Knowledge Constituted Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel. 
During the Prosecutor's direct questioning of Airman Lyon, the prosecutor asked Airman 
Lyon, "Going back to when you heard the threats and the things that you made statements about, 
was Steven aware that you were around when you made those statements?" (R. 00141: 31, lines 
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18-20.) To which Airman Lyon responded, "yes, sir." (R. 00141: 31, line 21.) The Prosecutor 
followed, " and so he would, and so he, when he asked you, as far as your concerned when he 
asked you to write this statement he was asking you to write something that he knew was false." 
R. 00141: 31, lines 22-24.) To which Airman Lyon responded, "yes, sir." (R. 00141: 31, line 
25.) At no time during this exchange did trial counsel object to the line of questioning, either on 
grounds of foundation, or testifying by the prosecuting attorney. As a result, the jury was 
allowed to hear, and consider without a curative instruction, a statement attributing a state of 
mind to the defendant, which was supported by no other evidence before the court. 
Utah R. Evid. 602 states " a witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is 
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter." 
Id. No evidence was introduced to support a contention to the effect that Airman Lyon had any 
personal knowledge whatsoever regarding whether Appellant was aware Airman Lyon was 
around when Appellant allegedly made threatening statements about his wife. Nor was there any 
evidence introduced to the establish the personal knowledge of Airman Lyon that Appellant was 
asking him to "write something that he knew was false." The fact that trial counsel failed to 
object to such a clear violation of the Utah Rules of Evidence is sufficient to satisfy the first 
prong of the Strickland test. See e.g., Callahan, 866 P.2d at 595 (failure of counsel to object to 
prosecutor's questioning in trial likely fails to meet the standard of reasonable representation). 
When viewed in light of all attendant circumstances, trial counsel's failure to object to 
this line of questioning clearly resulted in significant prejudice to Appellant. Throughout this 
brief, Appellant has maintained and established that the failure to instruct the jury as to the 
elements of the crimes charged has resulted in prejudice to the Appellant. While the failure to 
object to a line of questioning may be sustained under other circumstances as a "reasonable trial 
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strategy", under the attendant circumstances in this matter, trial counsel's error clearly affected 
the ability of the jury to reach a trustworthy verdict. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225. 
The key issue at trial was whether Appellant knowingly induced a person to testify or 
inform falsely under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 and whether Appellant knowingly submitted or 
invited reliance upon a writing, which he knew to be lacking in authenticity under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-504. By failing to object to the identified line of questioning, the danger of the jury 
misapplying the facts to the elements of the crimes charged was exacerbated to an unacceptable 
level. Had trial counsel objected to this line of questioning, it is unlikely that the jury would 
have reached a verdict based on Airman Lyon's testimony that he never told Appellant that the 
statement was untrue and Appellant's testimony the he never asked Lyon to do or say anything 
which Appellant believed to be untrue. By failing to object to the inaccurate and incomplete jury 
instructions, in conjunction with a failure to object to a line of questioning where the witness was 
invited to speculate as to Appellant's knowledge at the time the writings were made, trial counsel 
created a situation where the jury verdict is suspect and, but for these errors, the outcome of the 
trial would likely be different. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court reverse the convictions 
of the lower court and remand for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / l * d a y of August 2001. 
)LOUUL^( X^W^_ 
Kendall S. Peterson 
Jerald V. Hale 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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UT Code § 76-8-508, Tampering with witness--Retaliation against 
witness or informant--Bribery--Communicating a threat. 
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Utah Code § 76-8-508 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 76. CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 8. OFFENSES 
AGAINST THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF 
GOVERNMENT 
PART 5. FALSIFICATION IN 
OFFICIAL MATTERS 
Current through End of 2000 General 
Sess. 
§ 76-8-508. Tampering with witness-
Retaliation against witness or 
informant—Bribery—Communicating 
a threat. 
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if, 
believing that an official proceeding or 
investigation is pending or about to be instituted, 
he attempts to induce or otherwise cause a person 
to: 
(a) testify or inform falsely; 
(b) withhold any testimony, information. 
document, or item; 
(c) elude legal process summoning him to 
provide evidence; or 
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or 
investigation to which he has been summoned. 
(2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if 
he: 
(a) commits any unlawful act in retaliation for 
anything done by another as a witness or 
informant; 
(b) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any 
benefit in consideration of his doing any of the 
acts specified under Subsection (1); or 
(c) communicates to a person a threat that a 
reasonable person would believe to be a threat to 
do bodily injury to the person, because of any act 
performed or to be performed by the person in his 
capacity as a witness or informant in an official 
proceeding or investigation. 
As last amended by Chapter 175, Laws of Utah 1988; Laws 
2000, c. 1, § 115, ejf.May 1, 2000. 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
Copyright (c) West Group 2001 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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Utah Code § 76-8-504 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 76. CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 8. OFFENSES 
AGAINST THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF 
GOVERNMENT 
PARTS. FALSIFICATION IN 
OFFICIAL MATTERS 
(Information regarding effective 
dates, repeals, etc. is provided 
subsequently in this document.) 
Current through End of 2000 General 
Sess. 
§ 76-8-504. Written false statement 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if: 
(1) He makes a written false statement which he 
does not believe to be true on or pursuant to a 
form bearing a notification authorized by law to 
the effect that false statements made therein are 
punishable; or 
(2) With intent to deceive a public servant in 
the performance of his official function, he: 
(a) Makes any written false statement which he 
does not believe to be true; or 
(b) Knowingly creates a false impression in a 
written application for any pecuniary or other 
benefit by omitting information necessary to 
prevent statements therein from being misleading; 
or 
(c) Submits or invites reliance on any writing 
which he knows to be lacking in authenticity; or 
(d) Submits or invites reliance on any sample, 
specimen, map, boundary mark, or other object 
which he knows to be false. 
(3) No person shall be guilty under this section 
if he retracts the falsification before it becomes 
manifest that the falsification was or would be 
exposed. 
As enacted by Chapter 196, Laws of Utah 1973. 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 76. CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 8. OFFENSES 
AGAINST THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF 
GOVERNMENT 
PART 5. FALSIFICATION IN 
OFFICIAL MATTERS 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
Copyright (c) West Group 2001 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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RCRP Rule 19, RULE 19. INSTRUCTIONS Page 1 
*374 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 
19 
WEST'S UTAH RULES OF 
COURT 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 
Current with amendments received 
through JO-J-2000. 
RULE 19. INSTRUCTIONS 
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier 
time as the court reasonably directs, any party may 
file written request that the court instruct the jury 
on the law as set forth in the request. At the same 
time copies of such requests shall be furnished to 
the other parties. The court shall inform counsel 
of its proposed action upon the request; and it 
shall furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed 
instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such 
instructions may be given orally, or otherwise 
waive this requirement. 
(b) Upon each written request so presented and 
given, or refused, the court shall endorse its 
decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be 
given and part refused, the court shall distinguish, 
showing by the endorsement what part of the 
charge was given and what part was refused. 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of 
the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects 
thereto before the jury is instructed, stating 
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the 
ground of his objection. Notwithstanding a party's 
failure to object, error may be assigned to 
instructions in order to avoid a manifest injustice. 
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence 
in the case, and if the court refers to any of the 
evidence, it shall instruct the jury7 that they are the 
exclusive judges of all questions of fact. 
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be 
made after the court has instructed the jury. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation 
upon time for argument shall be within the 
discretion of the court. 
Copyright (c) West Group 2001 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNT*' 
STATE OF UTAH, FARMNGTON DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEPHEN LAMAR GEUKGEUZIAN, 
Defendant. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Case No. 001700592 
Judge: MICHAEL G. ALLPHIN 
Ladies and Gentlemen: Attached hereto are instructions numbered one through 
twenty-seven, given to you at the beginning of the trial. Additional instructions numbered 28 
through O / will be included at a later time in the proceedings. Taken together, these 
instructions govern your conduct and deliberations during the trial of this case and must be 
carefully followed. 
Dated this 3- day of _ , 2000. 
d 
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
1. GENERAL INSTRUCTION 
There are certain laws and rules which apply to this case. I'll explain them to you from time 
to time during the trial. Please pay careful attention. Each of you has been given a copy of these 
instructions. This copy is yours to keep. As I read these instructions to you, please follow along on 
your copy. Keep in mind the following points: 
Many Instructions. There will be many instructions. All are equally important. Don't pick 
out one and ignore the rest. Think about each instruction in the context of all the others. 
Obey Instructions. You must obey the instructions. You are not allowed to reach decisions 
that go against the law. 
Gender - Singular/Plural. In these instructions, the masculine gender such as "he" or 
,fhim"includes the feminine "she" or "her" and the singular such as "defendant" includes the 
plural "defendants" when appropriate. 
Note Taking. You may take notes during the trial, but don't over do it, and don't let it 
distract you from following the evidence. The use of notes in the jury room to refresh your 
memory is perfectly acceptable. But let me caution you not to rely excessively upon your 
notes. The lawyers will review important evidence in their closing arguments and help you 
focus on that which is most relevant to your decision. I also caution that notes are not 
evidence. Use them only to aid personal memory or concentration. One juror's opinion 
should not be given excessive consideration solely because that juror has taken notes. 
Keep an Open Mind. Don't form an opinion about the ultimate issues in this case until you 
have listened to all the evidence and the lawyers' summaries, along with the instructions on 
the law. Keep an open mind until then. 
2. WHAT RULES APPLY TO RECESSES 
From time to time I will call for a recess. It may be for a few minutes, a lunch break, 
overnight or longer. During recesses, do not talk about this case with anyone; not family, friends 
or even each other. The Clerk may ask you to wear a badge identifying yourself as a juror so that 
people will not try to discuss the case with you. Don't mingle with the lawyers, the parties, the 
witnesses or anyone else connected with the case. You may say "hello", or exchange similar 
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greetings or civilities with these persons, but don't engage in conversations. Don't accept from or 
give to any of these persons any favors, however slight, such as rides or food. Finally, don't read 
about this case in the newspaper or listen to or watch any reports on television or radio. These 
constraints are necessary for a fair trial. 
3. THE GENERAL ROLE OF THE JUDGE, THE JURY AND THE LAWYERS 
The judge, the jury and the lawyers are all officers of the Court and play important roles in 
the trial. 
Judge. It is my role as judge to decide all legal issues, supervise the trial and instruct the 
jury on the LAW that it must apply. 
Jury. It is your role as the jury to follow that law and decide the factual issues. Factual 
issues generally relate to WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW or similar things 
concerning which evidence will be presented. 
Lawyers. It is the role of the lawyers to present evidence, generally by calling and 
questioning witnesses and presenting exhibits. Each lawyer will also tryto persuade you to 
accept his version of the facts and to decide the case in favor of his client. 
Keep in mind that neither the lawyers nor I actually decide the case, because that is your role. 
Don't be influenced by what you think our personal opinions are; rather, you decide the case based 
upon the law explained in these instructions and the evidence presented in court. 
4. OUTLINE OF THE TRIAL 
The trial will generally proceed as follows: 
Opening Statements. The lawyers will outline what the case is about and indicate what 
they think the evidence will show. 
Presentation of Evidence. The plaintiff will offer its evidence first followed by the 
defendant. Each side may also offer rebuttal evidence after hearing the witnesses and 
seeing the exhibits offered by the other side. 
Instructions on the Law. After each side has presented its evidence, I will supplement 
these written instructions and review them with you. 
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Closing Arguments. The lawyers will then summarize and argue the case. They will 
share with you their respective views of the evidence, how it relates to the law and how 
they think you should decide the case. 
Jury Deliberation. The final step is for you to retire to the jury room and deliberate 
until you reach a verdict. 
5. THE CHARGE and THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
The defendant in this case has been accused of committing a crime. The 
accusation is in a written document called an INFORMATION, which will be read or 
summarized for you following this instruction. As you listen, keep in mind that the 
defendant has answered the charge by saying "not guilty." The defendant is presumed to 
be innocent of the charge. 
[THE INFORMATION WILL NOW BE READ TO THE JURY] 
COUNT 1 
TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS, as follows: That on or about May 15, 2000, at the 
place aforesaid, the defendant believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or 
about to be instituted, attempted to induce or otherwise cause a person to: testify or inform 
falsely; or withhold any testimony, information, document, item. 
COUNT 2 
WRITTEN FALSE STATMENT, as follows: That on or about May 18, 2000, at the place 
aforesaid, the defendant intending to deceive a public servant in the performance of his official 
function, made or caused to be made a written false statement which defendant did not believe to 
be true, knowingly created a false impression in a written application for a pecuniary or other 
benefit by omitting information necessary to prevent statements therein from being misleading or 
submitted or invited reliance upon a writing which defendant knew to be lacking in authenticity, 
or upon a sample, map, boundary mark, or other object which he knew to be false. 
6. WHAT IS THE JURY'S ROLE IN THIS CASE? 
You must decide whether the charge against the defendant has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Your decision is called a VERDICT. Your verdict must be based only on the 
evidence produced here in court. It must be based on facts, not on speculation. Don't guess about 
any fact. However, you may draw reasonable inferences or arrive at reasonable conclusions 
from the evidence presented. 
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7. WHAT IS EVIDENCE? 
Evidence is anything that tends to prove or disprove the existence of a disputed fact. It 
can be testimony, or documents, or objects, or photographs, or stipulations, or certain qualified 
opinions, or any combination of these things. Sometimes the lawyers may agree that certain 
facts exist. You should accept any agreed or stipulated facts as having been proved. In limited 
instances, I may take "judicial notice" of a well-known fact. If this happens, I will explain how 
you should treat it. 
Two classes of evidence are recognized and admitted in courts of law, upon either or both 
of which a jury may lawfully base its findings, whether favorable to the State or to the defendant. 
One type of evidence is known as direct and the other as circumstantial. The law makes 
no distinction between the two classes as to the degree of proof required for conviction or as to 
their effectiveness in defendant's favor, but respects each for such convincing force as it may 
carry and accepts each as a reasonable method of proof. 
Direct evidence of a person's conduct at any time in question consists of the testimony of 
every witness who, with any of his own physical senses, perceived such conduct or any part 
thereof, and which testimony describes or relates what thus was perceived. All other evidence 
admitted in the trial is circumstantial in relation to such conduct, and, insofar as it shows any act, 
statement or other conduct, or any circumstances of fact, tending to prove by reasonable 
inference the innocense or guilt of the defendant, it may be considered by you in arriving at a 
verdict. 
8- OPINION TESTIMONY 
Under certain circumstances, witnesses are allowed to express an opinion. A person who 
by education, study or experience has become an expert in any art, science or profession, may 
give his opinion and the reason for it. A layman (or, a non-expert) is also allowed to express an 
opinion if it is based on personal observations and it is helpful to understanding his testimony or 
the case. You are not bound to believe anyone's opinion. Consider it as you would any other 
evidence, and give it the weight you think it deserves. 
9. WHAT IS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED OR USED AS EVIDENCE? 
I've explained to you what evidence is. Now I'll tell you about some things which do not 
qualify as evidence or which, for some other good reason, you should not consider in reaching 
your verdict. 
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Accusation. The fact that formal charges have been filed accusing the defendant of 
committing a crime is not evidence of guilt. The defendant is a competent witness in the 
defendant's own behalf, and the fact that the defendant is charged with the commission of 
a crime should not be regarded by you as tending to impeach or discredit the defendant's 
testimony. 
Punishment. You may be aware of the gravity of the offense charged and the range of 
potential penalties, but you should not consider what actual punishment the defendant 
may receive if found guilty. That is for the judge to decide based upon the applicable law. 
Right to Remain Silent. If the defendant chooses not to testify in this case, don't consider 
that as evidence of guilt. The Constitution provides that an accused person has the right 
not to testify and you should not draw any negative inferences based upon the reliance on 
this right. 
Lawyer Statements. What the lawyers say is not evidence. Their purpose is to give you a 
preview of expected evidence and to help you understand the evidence from their 
viewpoint. 
Personal Investigation. Evidence is not what you can find out on your own. You should 
not make any investigation about the facts in this case. Do not make personal inspections, 
observations or experiments. Do not view premises, things or articles not produced in 
court. Don't let anyone else do anything like this for you. Don't look for information in 
law books, dictionaries or public or private records which are not produced in court. 
Out of Court Information. Do not consider anything you may have heard or read about 
this case in the media or by word of mouth or other out-of-court communication. You 
must rely solely on the evidence that is produced and received in court. 
10. THE JUDGE DECIDES WHAT EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE 
Sometimes a question will be raised about whether certain evidence is proper for the jury 
to consider. This type of question is called an OBJECTION. I rule on objections. If an objection 
is SUSTAINED the evidence is kept out and you should not consider it. If an objection is 
OVERRULED the evidence comes in and you may consider it. If evidence is STRICKEN you 
should ignore it. 
[OPENING STATEMENTS BY COUNSEL] aZ&D $> / 7 
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11. HOW TO MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT THE EVIDENCE 
Once evidence is admitted, you must decide three things about it: Whether it should be 
believed, how important it is, and what you can infer or conclude from it. 
Use your common sense as a reasonable person in making these decisions. Review all the 
evidence. Donft imagine things which have no evidence to back them up. Consider the evidence 
fairly without any bias or sympathy toward either side. 
12. DECIDING WHETHER TO BELIEVE A WITNESS 
As each witness testifies, you must decide how accurate that testimony is. It may help 
you to ask yourself questions such as these: 
Personal Interest. Does the witness have a personal interest in how the trial comes out? 
Other Bias. Does the witness have some other bias or motive to testify a certain way? 
Demeanor: What impression is made by the witness's appearance and conduct while 
answering questions? 
Consistency. Did the witness make conflicting statements or contradict other evidence? 
Knowledge and Memory. Did the witness have a good opportunity to know the facts and 
the ability to remember them? 
Reasonableness. Is the testimony reasonable in light of human experience? 
You're not required to believe all that a witness says. You are entitled to believe one 
witness as against many or many as against one, in accordance with your honest convictions. 
13. WHAT IF A WITNESS PURPOSELY GIVES FALSE TESTIMONY? 
If you believe a witness has purposely given false testimony about anything relevant to 
the case, you may disregard not only the false testimony but the remaining testimony from that 
witness unless it is corroborated by other evidence; in which event you should give it what 
weight you think it deserves. 
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14. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE TO CONVINCE THE JURY? 
The prosecution has the burden of proof. It is the one making the accusations in this case. 
The defendant is not required to prove innocence - you must start by assuming it. According to 
our law, the defendant is presumed to be innocent unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. This is a humane provision of the law intended to guard against the danger of an innocent 
person being unjustly punished. 
15. HOW CONVINCED MUST THE JURY BE BEFORE DECIDING THE 
DEFENDANT IS GUILTY? 
Before you can give up your assumption that the defendant is innocent, you must be 
convinced that the defendant's guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the 
understanding of reasonable persons who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. 
16. WHAT IS A REASONABLE DOUBT? 
A reasonable doubt is one based upon reason and common sense rather than speculation, 
supposition, emotion or sympathy. It is the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person 
hesitate to act. It must be real and not merely imaginary. It is such as would be retained by 
reasonable men and women after a full and impartial consideration of all the evidence, and must 
arise from the evidence or lack of evidence in the case. 
17. HOW TO EVALUATE DOUBT 
If after such full and impartial consideration some possible doubt exists, you must 
determine whether such doubt is reasonable in light of all the evidence. Ask yourselves if the 
doubt is consistent with reason and common sense. The law does not require that the evidence 
dispel all possible or conceivable doubt, but rather that it dispel all reasonable doubt. That is 
what is meant by the phrase "proof beyond a reasonable doubt". 
OPe/Uli/l^ Stub"* eJ% 
[THE EVIDENCE WILL NOW BE PRESENTED] 
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18. INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW THAT APPLIES TO THIS CASE 
The clerk has attached to your copy of these instructions some additional pages which 
contain instructions relating to the particular laws or rules that apply in this case. These 
additional instructions begin with instruction number twenty-eight (28). We will read those after 
completing our review of the following instructions which relate essentially to the procedure that 
you should follow. 
19. THE JUDGE IS IMPARTIAL 
The Constitution and the laws of this state absolutely prohibit the trial judge from making 
any comment about the witnesses or the evidence and I am not in any way permitted to assist you 
in determining what is or is not the truth in this case. 
Therefore, you are instructed that if during the trial I have said or done anything which 
has suggested to you that I am inclined to favor the claim or position of either party, you are not 
to permit yourselves to be influenced by any such suggestion. 
I have not intended to indicate any opinion as to which witnesses are, or are not, worthy 
of belief, nor which party should prevail. If any expression of mine has seemed to indicate an 
opinion relative to any of these matters, you should disregard it, because you are the sole and 
only judges of the facts. 
20. WHAT TO TAKE WITH YOU INTO THE JURY ROOM 
You may take the following things with you when you go into the jury room to discuss 
this case: 
a. all exhibits admitted in evidence; 
b. your notes (if any); 
c. your copy of these instructions; and 
d. the verdict form or forms. 
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21. WHAT TO DO IN THE JURY ROOM 
The first thing you should do in the jury room is choose a person to be in charge. This 
person is called the "Foreperson" or the "Chair." The Chair's duties are: 
a. To keep order and allow everyone a chance to speak; 
b. To represent the jury in any communications you make; and 
c. to sign your verdict and bring it back in court. 
In deciding what the verdict should be, all jurors are equal. The Chair has no more power 
than any other juror. 
22. CONSIDER EACH OTHERS OPINION, THEN REACH YOUR OWN 
DECISION BASED UPON HONEST DELIBERATION 
It is rarely productive or good for a juror, upon entering the jury room, to make an 
emphatic expression of opinion or to announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. 
When that is done at the outset, a person's sense of pride may block appropriate consideration of 
the case. Use your common memory, your common understanding and your common sense. Talk 
about the case with each other as you ponder and deliberate. 
Your verdict must be your own. Don't make a decision just to agree with everyone else. 
However, you should respect and consider the opinions of the other jurors. If you are persuaded 
that a decision you initially made was wrong, don't hesitate to change your mind. Help each other 
arrive at the truth. Also, don't resort to chance or some form of decision-making other than 
honest deliberation. 
23. WHAT TO DO IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS DURING DELIBERATION 
If you think you need more information or a clarification, write a note and give it to the 
bailiff. I will review it with the lawyers. We will answer your question whenever appropriate. 
However, these instructions should contain all the information you need to reach a verdict based 
upon the evidence. 
24. FOCUS ON THIS CASE ALONE 
Your duty is to decide this case and this case alone. You should not use this case as a 
forum for correcting perceived wrongs in other cases, or as a means of expressing individual or 
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collective views about anything other than the guilt or innocence of this defendant. Your verdict 
should reflect the facts as found by you applied to the law as explained in these instructions and 
should not be distorted by any outside factors or objectives. 
The final test of the quality of your service will be the verdict you return. You will 
contribute to efficient judicial administration if you focus exclusively on this case and return a 
just and proper verdict. 
25. REACHING A VERDICT 
This being a criminal case, your verdict must be unanimous; all jurors must agree. When 
you are all in agreement, then you have reached a verdict and your work is finished. 
26. HOW TO REPORT YOUR VERDICT 
When you have reached a verdict, the Chair should date and sign the verdict form which 
corresponds to your decision. Then notify the bailiff that you are ready to return to court. 
27. WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THE VERDICT HAS BEEN REPORTED 
After you have given your verdict to the judge, he or the clerk may ask each of you about 
it to make sure you agree with it. Then you will be excused from the jury box and you may leave 
at any time. You may remain in the courtroom, if you wish, to watch the rest of the proceedings, 
which should be quite brief. 
After you are excused, you may talk about the case with anyone. Likewise, you are not 
required to talk about it. If anyone attempts to talk to you about the case when you don't want to 
do that, please tell the Court Clerk. 
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INSTRUCTION NO 
These instructions contain the law that governs you in this case. In determining the facts, 
you may consider only the evidence given at this trial. Evidence which was rejected by me or 
ordered stricken out by me may not be considered by you. 
Not one of these instructions states all of the law of this case, but all of them must be 
taken and considered together inasmuch as they are connected with and relate to each other. 
You should not be concerned with the wisdom of any rule of law. Regardless of your 
own opinion, it would be a violation of your sworn duty to base you verdict upon any other view 
of the law than that given in my instructions. 
g. 
INSTRUCTION NO 
Before you can convict defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, of TAMPERING WITH 
A WITNESS, as charged in Count 1 of the Information, you must find from the evidence beyond 
a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of the crime: 
1. That on or about May 15, 2000, in Davis County, State of Utah: 
2. The Defendant Stephen Lamar Geukguzian, believing that an official proceeding 
or investigation is pending or about to be instituted; 
3. Attempted to induce or other cause a person to: 
a. Testify or inform falsely; or 
b. Withhold any testimony, information, document, or item. 
If, after careful consideration of all the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, guilty of TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS, as 
charged in Count 1 of the Information. 
If, on the other hand, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are 
not convinced of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then 
you must find the defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, not guilty of TAMPERING WITH A 
WITNESS, as charged in Count 1 of the Information. 
a 
INSTRUCTION NO. \)J) 
Before you can convict defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, of FALSE WRITTEN 
STATEMENT, as charged in Count 2 of the Information, you must find from the evidence 
beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of the crime: 
1. That on or about May l£, 2000, in Davis County, State of Utah: 
2. The Defendant Stephen Lamar Geukguzian, intending to deceive a public servant 
in the performance of his official function; 
a. Made or caused to be made a written false statement which defendant did 
not believe to be true; or 
b. Submitted or invited reliance upon a writing which defendant knew to be 
lacking in authenticity. 
If, after careful consideration of all the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, guilty of FALSE WRITTEN STATEMENT, as 
charged in Count 2 of the Information. 
If, on the other hand, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are 
not convinced of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then 
you must find the defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, not guilty of FALSE WRITTEN 
STATEMENT, as charged in Count 2 of the Information. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
% 
No person shall be guilty of WRITTEN FALSE STATEMENT, if he retracts the 
falsification before it becomes manifest that the falsification was or would be exposed. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 2 
When it is charged that a crime was committed on or about a certain date, if the jury finds 
that the crime was committed by a defendant, the proof need not show that it was committed at 
the time so alleged, but may be proved to have been committed sometime on or about the date 
alleged. 
15 INSTRUCTION NO 
A Domestic Relations Commissioner and other court personnel at a hearing regarding an 
application for a protective order are public servants acting in their official function. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A person engages in conduct: 
Intentionally, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when 
it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
yJ 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Intent, being a state of mind, is seldom susceptible of proof by direct and positive 
evidence and may ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, statement and circumstances. 
%. 
INSTRUCTION NO 3U 
In arriving at a verdict in this case, you shall not discuss or consider the subject of penalty 
or punishment, as that is a matter which lies with the court and other governmental agencies, and 
must not in any way affect your decision as to the innocence or guilt of the defendant. 
INSTRUCTION NO n 
Your verdict in this case must be in writing, signed by your foreperson and returned by 
you into the court. Your verdict must be as follows: 
COUNT 1 
GUILTY of TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS, 
OR 
NOT GUILTY of TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS 
COUNT2 
GUILTY of WRITTEN FALSE STATEMENT 
OR 
NOT GUILTY of WRITTEN FALSE STATEMENT. 
This being a criminal case, each and every juror is required to find a verdict of guilty. If 
there is not a unanimous verdict of 'guilty' by all jurors, then you amat find the defendant 
'guilty'. See Xjvsk jft^s" 
